S N 311 The newest development, found in the Northwest, especially in Sinkiang, is the partial industrialization of those areas which are the sources of coal, oil, gold, iron, alum, quartz, gypsum, nitrates, salt, and, as recently reported, uranium.

S N 563 The non-Chinese peoples of the Northwest are not only outnumbered b ut also outweighed in economic and political respects. For more than two thousand years, the Chinese have been ruling those areas (with short interruptions as far as Sinkiang and Chinghai are concerned), even though they never had more than a few garrisons stationed in frontier areas. Those garrisons made it possible for a thin stratum of Chinese officials to rule the areas on the top level. On the lower level, the indigenous peoples and tribes governed themselves - under the supervision of the Chinese viceroys or governors and their bureaucracy.

S N 175 642 199 631 The general policy of the Chinese government in Peking was to make use of the existing form of governmental institutions of frontier areas like Sinkiang, Chinghai, and Inner-Mongolia. In Sinkiang (prior to 1884 it was called "Hui-chiang," i.e., Muslimic Dominion), two types of local government had existed: the Muslimic type and the Mongolian type. The S [191] Northern and Northeastern part of Sinkiang, where the Mongols were the dominant inhabitants, had the same governmental institutions as Outer and Inner-Mongolia, namely, banners ruled by dzasaks, who were appointees of the Emperor in S N [68] Peking. The Republic of China tacitly recognized their ranks and interfered very little with their functions. Only Communist [565] China deprived the nomad aristocracy of their titles and rights.

175 631 795 647 657 The Muslimic communities were fuled by Bäks with various ranks: the Ak'im Bäk, "local governor"; the Ishkhan Bäk, "assistant governor"; the Shang Bäk, "collector of revenue"; the Qazi, "judge"; the Kukbashi or Mirabu Bäk, "superintendant of agriculture"; Yüzbashi, "hundred-men-leader"; Onbashi, "ten-men-leader"; etc. All the local Bäks were appointed by the emperor or later on by the president of the Republic upon the recommendation of the Imperial or Republican governor, although it must be stated that some governors of Sinkiang, Chin Shu-jen and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, ruled and governed the S N province without asking Peking for the consent of appointments.

175 631 647 [202] Besides the Chinese civil service there existed Chinese military staffs and detachments, centered in Ili, Urumchi, Kulja, Chuguchak, Kashghar, Sining, Su-chou, Lan-chou, etc. Relay stations provided communication between the government in Peking and the frontier areas. Maintaining the effectiveness of the means of communications was an important duty of 000 Chinese officials. Only since 1930 have some automobile highways been built, and the Communist regime, in cooperation

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489 Only since 1930 have some automobile high-
496 ways been built, and the Communist regime, in cooperation
648 with Soviet Russia, are building the first Inner Asiatic railway,
668 linking Alma-Ata with Lan-chou. This railway will, without
195 doubt, speed up the Sinification of the frontier areas, and
[491] above all add industrialization to agriculture and pastoral
SN nomadism.

631 As far as Chinhai was concerned, the Western Mongols
563 (the Oirats) were also locally ruled by dzasaks, the leaders
657 of banners. Unlike the banners of Inner and Outer Mongolia
195 and Sinkiang, however, they did not combine banners to form leagues or to elect one of their tribal leaders as the captain-general of the league. The Chinese governor- with his seat in Sining - functioned as captain-general. In regard to the nomadic Tibetans, the Chinese government appointed chieftains as dzasak-lamas and gave them the rights and the privileges which this office involves. The sedentary Tibetans were ruled by t'u-ssus, also appointees of the Peking government. By and large, this governmental pattern existed until
SN the Communists came into power.

563 The form of governing non-Chinese peoples changed in the
659 course of time in various ways, but one thing never changed:
195 the aim of the Peking government to rule, to suppress, to exploit, and to sinify them.

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631 Unlike the eighteen provinces in China proper, the province
635 of Sinkiang (after 1884) and the Eastern Three Provinces, (after
195 1907) the areas comprising Mongolia, Tibet, and Chinese Turkestan, although occupying more space than China proper, were
S administrated by a quite different type of governmental system.
631 Political subdivisions of the Chinese Empire such as Mongolia,
657 Chinese Turkestan and Tibet were usually referred to as de-
195 pendencies. This is however an inaccurate translation of
647 the Chinese term "fan," which really means "the barbarian west." Since the cultural, ethnic and historical background in these areas was very different from the rest of the Empire, these regions required, and in practice had, a very particular type of governmental control. All these frontier territories were administered by the "Department of Dependencies" in Peking. This department was subdivided into the following bureaus:

a. Inner Mongolian bureau, that administered frontier boundaries, titles of nobility, appointment of officials, military affairs, league conferences, and finally organization of banner units of Inner Mongolia.

b. "Reception bureau" for Inner Mongolia nobility, that was responsible for the payments and allowances to the Inner Mongolian aristocracy.

c. Eastern Turkestan bureau, that was in charge of Moslem affairs in Eastern Turkestan.

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631 d. Justice bureau which took care of the civil and criminal
657 cases of the frontier area.
175 e. Territorial development bureau which took care of the
647 preservation of forests, wild animals and which was in charge of the improvement of live-stock, fur curing and of the Mongolian
S N inhabitants in general.

175 The Yüan and Manchu dynasties, which themselves repre-
657 sented minorities, employed a quite different, one might say a
563 positive attitude towards non-Chinese. Generally speaking, the Manchus functioned and acted as the mediators between the
S N minorities and the Chinese. But even the Manchus, after they
175 had become completely sinified, used colonial methods that
657 led to revolts and uprisings in Sinkiang, in Kansu and in Chinghai.
563 The Chinese Muslims in Kansu, e.g., revolted in 1648, 1781-1784,
669 1820-28, 1862-78, 1895-97, 1918-21, 1928-1929, at which times they tried, with little success, to get rid of the Chinese mastery and to establish their own Muslimic realm. Whenever such uprisings occurred, the Muslimic Turks of Sinkiang sympathized with them or revolted at the same time. In Sinkiang, Yakub Bäk even succeeded in establishing a short-lived Muslimic empire between 1864-1877. The Western Mongols of Sinkiang, Kansu and Chinhai, who revolted and established the Dzungarian Empire between 1673 and 1697, were defeated by a Chinese army in 1697 and again in 1757. In Chinghai, the Tanguts (Tibetans) revolted successfully many times, but like all other minorities who tried and failed, they were eventually brought under Chinese control again. Needless to say, all these unsuccessful petty revolutions, revolts and uprisings of non-Chinese or Chinese Muslims, always upset the economy of the area greatly, increasing thereby the hatred towards the Chinese in general, and the Chinese officials in particular.

S N 175 631 619 II. Main Patterns of Social Life, Social Organization and Mode of Economy of the Minorities.

Even though the Northwest is occupied by a fantastic conglomeration of heterogeneous societies, it still can be, and always has been, considered by politicians as one area, a political, military, and economic unit, and also as the "land of promise," which it in fact became. When the Communists again set up the unit as an administrative area in 1949, it was only the continuation of an old concept, held by the Chinese rulers because of the geographical location of the Northwest and its commercial traditions (silk road, Mongolia-Tibet road, Chinghai-Tibet road, Sinkiang-India road, Sinkiang-Russia road), which culminated in Sheng Shih-ts'ai's cooperation with Russia, or earlier with Yakub Bäk's policy

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*563 III. Resentment of Chinese Rule
578 These internal differences have made it impossible for the people of the Northwest to cast off their Chinese rulers by united action and to establish a Turkic, Uighur, or federated government of their own. In Sinkiang, 90 per cent of the population is
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[162] non-Chinese, yet the forces of nationalism and of religion, which at times made for a temporary unity, were not strong enough to transform the sporadic revolts into a lasting revolutionary movement and complete independence.

There always has been a great deal of friction between the Chinese and the non-Chinese as a result of the differences in cultural heritage. In addition, the Chinese form a ruling minority in many parts of the Northwest and appear to the native people as a foreign government of occupation. In this situation, the Chinese Moslems (the Dungans) have found themselves caught between two fires. At times they sided with their Kirghiz and Uighur co-religionists, and at other times they were compelled to support their non-Moslem Chinese compatriots. As a result, they have been distrusted by everyone and have suffered a double persecution during times of upheaval and nationalistic or religious fanaticism.

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*175 The Chinese method of ruling minority peoples involved the
657 system of "divide and rule" and created friction not only with China,
*563 but also among the tribes themselves. The policies of Tso Tung-
578 t'ang in the latter part of the nineteenth century, can be taken as an example. He managed to place great power in the hands of his
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175 own relatives and friends, and to strengthen the old social struc-
• 657 tures of the Mongols, Uighurs and Kazakhs through the existing
563 Begs and princes who became instruments of Chinese rule. He
578 considered the Chinese Moslems to be traitors and killed large numbers of them while showing leniency toward the Uighurs, Mongols and Kazakhs. After the Revolution of 1911, during the governorship of Yang Tseng-hsin, the tradition of setting one people against another was continued. Fearing that the Mongols of Sinkiang might unite with the Mongols of Outer Mongolia during the revolution there, heavy restrictions were imposed upon them, while the Kazakhs were even allowed to carry arms. Under the previous Manchu rule, the Mongols were favored over the Kazakhs; they were considered the rightful owners of pasture lands, while the Kazakh tribes were treated as their "tenants."

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175 In the case of the Turkic Moslems, nationalism and religion
669 are almost inseparable. Their rebellions against the Chinese have
648 been the most persistent and the most violent, but only one short
668 period of freedom has broken two centuries of Chinese control. Ever since 1759, when the Manchu general, Chao-hui, drove the ruling Moslem Khojas into Khokand and extended Chinese rule into Turkestan, the bitter resentment aroused by foreign control has flared into periodic revolt. In the nineteenth century, while the

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668 training takes time before these technicians, accountants, etc.,
241 can go out and organize co-ops, operate them efficiently, and train other native cadres. The 1955 plan calls for the training of 600 technical cadres for the "Centers for Promoting Agricultural Techniques," for the training of 500 in-office cadres by rotation, and for the training of 4,190 accountants and 5,337 techniciens for agricultural producer cooperatives.

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668 An additional problem (which will be mentioned at this point
• 657 rather than repeated when each province of the Northwest is dis-
736 cussed) concerns the soldiers' dependents in the region and the
494 plight of discharged army personnel. The State has been particu-
729 larly upset by the lack of participation of these groups in coopera-
[464] tivization and special attention is now being devoted to utilize this source of manpower. Since dependents of servicement are given certain State stipends, in food, many of them feel that by joining a cooperative they will be deprived of this compensation. Because 1955 was a critical year in the Five Year Plan, the pace of erecting new co-ops and consolidating the older ones has been increased. Now many of the dependents and demobilized soldiers who were organized in these co-ops have backed out of them and many of these co-ops have, therefore, never been consolidated. Another problem in the co-ops is that the members do not want partly disabled or female workers, and, on the other hand, many dependents feel that the State should provide for them. (No. 1004, March 10, 1955, Supplements. "Actively Organizing Servicemen's Dependents for Mutual Aid and Co-op Work." U.S. Consulate General. Survey of China Mainland Press.) The proper allocation of labor in the Northwest remains a critical problem.

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2. Chinghai

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* 668 By December, 1954, 575 agricultural producer co-ops had been formed, and this constituted 9.12 per cent of all households.
494 The number of mutual aid co-ops was not given but it was reported
452 that 69.7 per cent of all households had been cooperativized to
[476] some extent. There were also 159 supply and marketing coopera-tives, 148 credit cooperatives, and 12 handicraft producer co-ops. Long term low interest loans have been extended to poor peasants to encourage them to join farming co-ops. The first allocation totalled over 138 million yuan (U.S. $5,598). The interest rate is 0.4 per cent monthly and the repayment period is spread over five years. Besides these individual loans to poor peasants, there have been additional ones to enable the peasants to build small water conservancy works and buy new types of farm tools. All totalled, state loans amounted to more than 750 million yuan (U.S. $30,426) for 1955. (Far Eastern Economic Review. Dec. 1, 1955. pp. 686-87.)

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* 668 In a provincial report by Chan Kuo-sheng, Secretary General
241 of the Chinghai Provincial People's Government, on work
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